At a glance
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-123890 (Broadcom advisory VMSA-2026-0009, updated to 0009.1 on 20 November) |
| Component | VMware Directory Service (vmdir) inside vCenter, reached over DCE/RPC on TCP 2012 |
| Bug class | Authentication bypass (Mandiant: unauthenticated SRP-6a session key disclosure) |
| Impact | Unauthenticated attacker gets a session as administrator@vsphere.local, i.e. full control of vCenter and the VMs it manages |
| Severity | CVSS 3.1 9.8 Critical (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| Fixed in | vCenter 8.0 U3m · vCenter 9.0.2.0200 · vCenter 9.1.1.0200 · VCF 5.x: 5.2.5 with async patch (KB88287) · Telco Cloud Platform / Infrastructure: KB463116 |
| Not fixed | vCenter 7.0 (no public build; extended-support customers must contact Broadcom). 6.5 and 6.7 are end of life and should be presumed vulnerable |
| Disclosed | 19 November 2026 |
What is wrong
vCenter's built-in identity store, the VMware Directory Service, exposes an RPC interface used during single sign-on. According to Mandiant's analysis, a flaw in how that interface handles its SRP key exchange lets a caller with no credentials recover a valid session key. With it, the attacker is treated as the built-in SSO administrator. From there they own vCenter: they can create accounts, enable SSH, read the identity database and reach every ESX host and VM it manages.
Broadcom's own description is short: an attacker with network access to vCenter can bypass authentication. The same advisory also fixes four lower-rated bugs (CVSS 6.7–8.1) in SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows (CVE-2026-123891 to CVE-2026-123894). Patch those too, but they are not the emergency here.
Who is exposed
- Any vCenter Server 7.0, 8.0, 9.0 or 9.1 below the fixed build, including the vCenter inside VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation and Telco Cloud products.
- It does not matter whether Enhanced Linked Mode is used.
- ESX hosts themselves are not vulnerable, but they fall with vCenter once it is compromised.
- Highest risk: vCenter reachable from user networks, VPN pools, jump servers shared with other systems, or (worst case) the internet. In the observed attack, the group was already inside the network through a separate remote-support appliance zero-day and then pivoted to vCenter.
Is it exploited?
Yes, per Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group. They report ARMORY CASTLE used it in early September 2026 with a custom Go tool they call BONESAW, which dumps the Directory Service database, steals SAML signing material and creates an SSO admin account. Other tools in the same intrusions: SAWSNAKE (SAML bypass / Golden SAML), BEARBONES (Dropbear-based SSH backdoor), LAZYBONES (backdoor using Slack for command and control) and two JSP web shells. Broadcom's advisory itself does not state exploitation. We could not confirm a CISA KEV listing at the time of writing; check the catalog before you set your deadline, but do not wait for it.
How to check
Read-only checks only.
Version (PowerCLI, from an admin workstation):
Connect-VIServer -Server vcenter.example.local
$global:DefaultVIServers | Select-Object Name, Version, Build
Version (vCenter appliance shell):
vpxd -v
Compare against the fixed builds in the table. In the VAMI (https://<vcenter>:5480) the Summary page also shows the version.
Signs of compromise on the appliance (based on Mandiant's published indicators):
# Tool drop locations and the LAZYBONES persistence binary
ls -la /tmp/123 /tmp/sss /tmp/dbr /tmp/123.key /tmp/123.rar /usr/bin/vmtoolscs 2>/dev/null
systemctl list-units --all | grep -i vmtoolscs
# Web shells
find / -xdev \( -name 'ActiveSer.jsp' -o -name 'u.jsp' \) 2>/dev/null
# Unexpected listeners (BEARBONES uses TCP 33992)
ss -tlnp | grep -E ':33992\b'
# /bin/env should not be SUID
ls -l /bin/env
Also review in the vSphere Client:
- Administration → Single Sign On → Users and Groups: any recent local
@vsphere.localadmin you did not create (Mandiant saw one startingsps-). - Administration → Global Permissions: new Administrator grants.
- VAMI → Access: SSH or the BASH shell enabled when your standard says off.
- On ESX hosts: unexpected keys in root's
authorized_keysand hidden directories on datastores.
How to fix
- Patch vCenter to 8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200 or 9.1.1.0200 (or the VCF 5.2.5 async patch / Telco KB). Fixes are cumulative and cannot be applied with vCenter Quick Patch. Take a file-based backup and snapshot first.
- Watch the upgrade path. Broadcom notes that 8.0 U3m and 9.0.2.0200 block a later move to VCF 9.1.1. If that upgrade is planned, either go to 9.1.1.0200 now or plan for VCF 9.1.2. Do not delay the security fix to keep that option.
- On vCenter 7.0: there is no public fix. Open a case if you hold extended support; otherwise plan the move to 8.0 U3m now and isolate the appliance until then.
- Patch SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows from the same advisory in your normal cycle.
- If you find any indicator above, do not just patch. Treat the SSO domain as compromised: the attacker may hold SAML signing keys. Rebuild trust (rotate the STS signing certificate, reset
administrator@vsphere.localand service accounts, review identity-provider federation) as part of incident response.
If you can't patch yet
Broadcom lists no workaround. Reduce exposure instead:
- Allow vCenter ports (443, 5480, 2012, 22, 389) only from dedicated admin hosts / PAW subnets at the network firewall. Mandiant also suggests host-level filtering on the appliance; test any appliance-level change carefully, as it is not a Broadcom-supported workaround.
- Disable SSH and the BASH shell on the appliance unless actively needed.
- Forward vCenter and VAMI logs to your SIEM (remote syslog) so evidence survives if the appliance is wiped.
- Review remote-access and remote-support appliances that can reach the management network. They were the way in for this group.
Detection ideas
Microsoft Defender XDR (Advanced Hunting): endpoints talking to the vmdir RPC port. Only vCenter peers and your admin hosts should ever do this.
// Connections to vCenter Directory Service RPC (TCP 2012) from unexpected sources
let AdminHosts = dynamic(["paw01", "paw02"]); // edit: your admin workstations
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(90d)
| where RemotePort == 2012 and ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt")
| where DeviceName !in~ (AdminHosts)
| summarize Attempts = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp)
by DeviceName, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by FirstSeen asc
Microsoft Sentinel: vCenter / VAMI syslog for SSH being switched on and new SSO accounts. Field names depend on your connector; adjust to your parser.
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where Computer has "vcenter" or HostName has "vcenter" // edit to your appliance names
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("/rest/appliance/access/ssh", "access/ssh", "vsphere.local")
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("PUT", "enabled", "created", "CreateLocalUser", "sps-")
| project TimeGenerated, HostName, ProcessName, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Also hunt network logs for the attacker IPs Mandiant published (see the GTIG reference), and for inbound SSH banners or listeners on TCP 33992 in the management VLAN. Mandiant's post includes YARA rules for each tool family.
Checklist
- Inventory every vCenter (including those inside VCF and Telco stacks) and record the build
- Patch to 8.0 U3m / 9.0.2.0200 / 9.1.1.0200 or the VCF / Telco equivalent
- Plan an exit from vCenter 7.0, 6.7 and 6.5
- Restrict vCenter management ports to admin hosts only
- Disable SSH / BASH on the appliance
- Check SSO users, global permissions and the IOC paths above
- Forward vCenter and VAMI logs to Sentinel; run the hunting queries back to 1 September 2026
- Review remote-support and remote-access appliances that can reach vCenter
- If anything is found: start incident response and rotate SSO signing material
How Kage can help
- Exposure check: we map which networks can reach your vCenter and VAMI ports and tighten the rules.
- Compromise assessment: our incident response team reviews appliances, SSO and ESX hosts for the indicators in this advisory.
- Monitoring: our threat intelligence service tracks exploitation of new vulnerabilities against your sector.
References
- Broadcom: VMSA-2026-0009 security advisory
- Broadcom: VMSA-2026-0009 questions and answers (GitHub)
- Google Threat Intelligence / Mandiant: ARMORY CASTLE exploits vSphere
- The Hacker News: China-linked hackers exploit critical vCenter zero-day
Facts as of 21 November 2026. We will update this post if Broadcom publishes a vCenter 7.0 fix or CISA adds the CVE to KEV.