Threat Intel · 20 Nov 2026

PHP's November security release: two session RCE bugs (CVE-2026-115560, CVE-2026-126714) and a PHP2Shell follow-up

PHP 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37 and 8.2.36 fix two session-handling bugs that can lead to code execution, an incomplete fix for PHP2Shell, and PHP-FPM, PHP-CGI and PHAR issues. The RCE paths need uncommon setups, but after PHP2Shell we treat this as a prompt update.

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At a glance

ItemDetail
Main CVEsCVE-2026-115560 (session serializer mismatch) · CVE-2026-126714 (partially overwritten session files)
Also fixedCVE-2026-129481 (session use-after-free, incomplete fix for PHP2Shell's CVE-2026-109619) · CVE-2026-129538 (PHP-CGI PATH_INFO) · CVE-2026-129289 (PHP-FPM request smuggling) · CVE-2026-129291 (PHP-FPM local privilege escalation) · CVE-2026-129292 (FPM status page XSS) · CVE-2026-128090 (PHAR signature downgrade) · CVE-2026-129496 (date/timezone cache use-after-free)
ImpactRemote code execution in specific configurations; privilege escalation and request smuggling in PHP-FPM
SeverityPHP rates the release critical; the critical issues need non-default or uncommon setups
Fixed in8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37, 8.2.36 · new 8.6.0 includes the fixes
Not fixedPHP 8.1 and older (unsupported)
DisclosedCVE-2026-115560 announced 23 October; fixes released 19 November 2026

What is wrong

PHP can store session data in three formats (php, php_binary, php_serialize). CVE-2026-115560 needs a specific combination:

  1. The server config sets session.serialize_handler to php_binary or php_serialize.
  2. The application switches it to php with ini_set() before session_start().
  3. Session upload progress is on, which is the default.

When the write format and the read format differ, data an attacker sends in a file-upload request can be read back as object data. Turning that into code execution needs a usable "gadget chain" in the application; without one, the usual result is a broken session or a crash. CVE-2026-126714 is a second route in the same area, through a session file that is only partly overwritten.

The rest of the release matters for exposure too: PHP-CGI facing the internet, PHP-FPM status pages left open, and PHAR archives with weak signatures each have a fix in this batch.

Who is exposed

BranchVulnerableUpdate to
PHP 8.58.5.12 and earlier8.5.13
PHP 8.48.4.27 and earlier8.4.28
PHP 8.38.3.36 and earlier8.3.37
PHP 8.28.2.35 and earlier8.2.36 (end of life 31 December 2026)
PHP 8.1 and olderAllUnsupported: upgrade or use a vendor with extended support

Typical places PHP hides: WordPress, Drupal and Magento sites, Laravel apps, hosting panels (cPanel, Plesk, CloudPanel), php: container images and appliances with built-in web consoles.

Is it exploited?

Not as of 20 November. We still recommend updating this week rather than waiting for the next maintenance window: attackers diffed the October fixes within hours, and the CVE-2026-129481 entry shows the PHP2Shell area is still active.

How to check

# versions: CLI and FPM can differ, check the one serving web traffic
php -v
ls /usr/sbin/php-fpm* 2>/dev/null
dpkg -l 'php*' 2>/dev/null | grep '^ii' | grep -E 'common|fpm|cli'
rpm -qa 'php*' 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'common|fpm|cli'

# session settings in ini files and FPM pools
grep -rnE 'serialize_handler|upload_progress' /etc/php* /etc/php-fpm.d 2>/dev/null

# application code that switches the handler at runtime
grep -rnE "ini_set\(\s*['\"]session\.serialize_handler" /var/www 2>/dev/null

# php-cgi in use? FPM status page configured?
ps -eo pid,user,cmd | grep -E '[p]hp-cgi|[p]hp-fpm'
grep -rn 'pm.status_path' /etc/php* /etc/php-fpm.d 2>/dev/null

Across a fleet onboarded to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint:

DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
| where SoftwareName has "php"
| summarize Devices = dcount(DeviceId) by SoftwareVendor, SoftwareName, SoftwareVersion
| order by Devices desc

How to fix

  1. Update to 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37 or 8.2.36, or your distribution's package with the backported fixes (compare against the vendor advisory, not the upstream number).
  2. Restart PHP-FPM and, if you use mod_php, Apache. Running workers keep the old code.
  3. Rebuild php: based container images; ask panel and appliance vendors for their builds.
  4. Confirm the October PHP2Shell fixes (8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35 or later) are everywhere too.
  5. Plan the move off PHP 8.2 before 31 December 2026.

If you can't patch yet

PHP's workaround is the same one used for PHP2Shell. If you set it in October, keep it:

; php.ini
session.upload_progress.enabled = 0

; or in each PHP-FPM pool file
php_admin_value[session.upload_progress.enabled] = 0

It must be set in php.ini or the pool config (not .user.ini or ini_set()), followed by a worker restart. watchTowr notes it reduces but doesn't fully close CVE-2026-126714, so treat it as a bridge. Also remove runtime changes to session.serialize_handler, limit the FPM status page to localhost or monitoring hosts, and don't expose php-cgi to the internet.

Detection ideas

PHP workers spawning shells or download tools is a strong signal after any PHP RCE:

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName matches regex @"^php(-fpm)?[0-9.]*$" or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("php-cgi", "apache2", "httpd")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash", "curl", "wget", "python3", "perl", "nc")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Also watch for PHP-FPM worker segfaults and unusual multipart upload traffic to endpoints that don't accept uploads.

Checklist

  • Inventory PHP on servers, containers, panels and appliances
  • Update to 8.5.13 / 8.4.28 / 8.3.37 / 8.2.36 and restart FPM or Apache
  • Keep session.upload_progress.enabled = 0 wherever you can't patch today
  • Search code for runtime session.serialize_handler changes
  • Lock down FPM status pages; retire internet-facing php-cgi
  • Confirm the October PHP2Shell fixes are in place
  • Schedule the PHP 8.2 upgrade before 31 December

How Kage can help

  • Exposure check: we map PHP versions and risky settings across your web estate, including hosting panels and containers.
  • Testing: our VAPT service verifies that patched and mitigated sites are no longer exposed.
  • Compromise assessment: if a site was unpatched during the PHP2Shell wave, our incident response team checks it for web shells and follow-on access.

References

Facts as of 20 November 2026.