Threat Intel · 20 Nov 2026

Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938): a Base64 heap overflow in the JVM that reaches Jira, Jenkins and Keycloak

A bug in HotSpot's AVX-512 Base64 decoder lets a short, malformed Base64 string overwrite the Java heap. Researchers turned it into pre-auth RCE on default installs of Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Jenkins, Artifactory and PingFederate. Which hosts are affected, which builds fix it, and the JVM flag to use until you can patch.

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At a glance

ItemDetail
CVECVE-2026-114938 ("Java4Shell", named by Calif; its memory-leak side is called "JavaBleed")
ComponentHotSpot JVM intrinsic for Base64 decoding using AVX-512 VBMI, x86-64 only
Bug classLength underflow leading to a heap buffer overflow
ImpactJVM crash, heap memory disclosure (keys, tokens, personal data), remote code execution with a product-specific chain
SeverityOracle CVSS 3.1 8.1 · Calif CVSS 4.0 9.2 · Red Hat Critical
Fixed inOpenJDK/Oracle 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1, 27.0.1.1 · Oracle Java 8 EPP 8u513-perf
Not fixedEnd-of-life Java 18–20, 22–24 and 26
Disclosed17 November 2026

What is wrong

To decode Base64 quickly, HotSpot swaps the Java code for hand-written AVX-512 assembly. With one particular malformed input, the length calculation in that fast path goes negative and the routine writes a few dozen bytes past its output buffer on the heap. This happens before Java's own validation can reject the string, so input checks in the application don't help.

What the overflow hits depends on which object sits next to the buffer, so every product needs its own exploit chain. Calif built chains for unauthenticated RCE in the default configuration of Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate, and authenticated RCE in Kafka, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit and Spinnaker. A Java client that connects over TLS to a hostile server can also be hit.

Who is exposed

A host is exposed only when all three are true:

ConditionExposedNot exposed
Java buildOpenJDK-based 17.0.6 and later, 21, 25, 27 from any vendor; Oracle Java 8 EPP 8u511b33-perfStandard Java 8 and 11, 17 before 17.0.6, fixed builds
ArchitectureHotSpot on x86-64ARM64 (Graviton, Ampere, Apple silicon)
CPUAVX-512 VBMI: Intel Ice Lake and newer Xeons, AMD Zen 4 and newerx86-64 CPUs without AVX-512 VBMI

Base64 shows up wherever Java handles logins and APIs: Basic auth headers, JWTs, SAML assertions, file uploads. Much of that is parsed before the user is authenticated.

Is it exploited?

As of 18 November:

  • GreyNoise reported exploitation attempts and scanning, with no confirmed intrusions.
  • VulnCheck said a working RCE exploit had been available to its customers since the evening of 17 November.
  • Wiz reported building a working proof of concept in about two hours and proving remote exploitation against Jenkins, Confluence and Tomcat.
  • Unverified "exploit" repositories are appearing on GitHub. Don't run them.

How to check

# CPU: all four flags printed = the vulnerable code path can run
grep -m1 '^flags' /proc/cpuinfo | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^(avx512f|avx512bw|avx512vbmi|bmi2)$'

# every running JVM and the binary it uses (bundled JREs included)
for p in $(pgrep -x java); do echo "$p $(readlink -f /proc/$p/exe)"; done
/path/to/jre/bin/java -version 2>&1

# a container image
docker run --rm --entrypoint java <image> -version
# Windows: every java.exe on C: with its version
Get-ChildItem C:\ -Filter java.exe -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  ForEach-Object { "{0}  {1}" -f $_.VersionInfo.ProductVersion, $_.FullName }

Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management can do the inventory across the estate once the CVE is in its feed:

DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| where CveId == "CVE-2026-114938"
| summarize Devices = dcount(DeviceId) by SoftwareVendor, SoftwareName, SoftwareVersion
| order by Devices desc

How to fix

DistributionFixed builds (as of 18 November)
Oracle Java SE / OpenJDK17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1, 27.0.1.1; 8u513-perf (EPP)
Microsoft Build of OpenJDK17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1
Amazon Corretto17.0.21.1.2, 21.0.13.1.2, 25.0.5.1.2, 27.0.1.1.4 (Docker tags unchanged: re-pull)
Azul Zulu17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1, 27.0.1.1
Eclipse Temurin21.0.13.1+2, 25.0.5.1+2, 27.0.1.1+4; 17 still pending
Red Hat, Ubuntu, Debian stableFixes pending
  1. Install the fixed runtime, including the copies bundled inside products such as Jira, Confluence, Jenkins and Keycloak.
  2. Restart every JVM. A service that has been running for weeks keeps executing the old code until it restarts.
  3. Rebuild container images that bundle Java and redeploy them.
  4. Move anything on Java 18–20, 22–24 or 26 to a supported LTS release. Those lines will not be fixed.

If you can't patch yet

Turn off the vulnerable intrinsic with a JVM flag. It takes effect on restart and may slow Base64-heavy workloads:

-XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics

# applied to every JVM a service starts
export JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS="-XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics"

-XX:UseAVX=2 also works on x86-64 but prevents the JVM from starting on ARM. Test either flag first; neither was tested on Java 27. Meanwhile, put internet-facing Keycloak, PingFederate, Jira, Confluence, Jenkins and Artifactory behind a VPN or an access proxy such as Microsoft Entra application proxy. Size limits and WAF rules won't reliably help, because the malicious input is tiny.

Detection ideas

A Java service should rarely start a shell. In Microsoft Defender for Endpoint:

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "curl", "wget", "certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Also watch for unexpected JVM crash files (hs_err_pid*.log) and new outbound connections from Java services. If an unpatched service was reachable from the internet, review it and rotate the secrets it holds.

Checklist

  • Inventory every Java runtime: servers, bundled JREs, images, appliances, CI agents
  • Flag hosts with all four CPU flags as priority one
  • Update to the fixed build and restart every JVM
  • Set -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics where you can't patch today, with an end date
  • Take identity, build and collaboration consoles off the open internet until patched
  • Retire Java 18–20, 22–24 and 26
  • Alert on Java processes spawning shells and on JVM crash files

How Kage can help

  • Exposure check: we find Java runtimes across servers, containers and vendor products, and rank them by CPU, version and internet exposure.
  • Identity first: our Entra hardening service helps move exposed identity providers and admin consoles behind Conditional Access and application proxy.
  • Compromise assessment: if an unpatched service was exposed, our incident response team reviews it and helps rotate secrets.

References

Facts as of 20 November 2026. Red Hat, Ubuntu, Debian stable and Temurin 17 fixes were still pending; exploitation status can change quickly.